Developing countries are confronted with the progressive erosion of their trade tax revenue, which then reduces their total tax revenue. In light of the unavoidable process of trade liberalization, such countries have engaged in tax transition reform to change their tax revenue structure in favor of domestic tax revenue. The current analysis uses a measure of tax transition reform (tax reform) to examine whether countries that engage in tax reform experience greater trade openness. The empirical analysis covers 92 developing countries from 1980 to 2014 and shows that tax reform is positively associated with trade openness. Interestingly, least developed countries (LDCs) appear to enjoy a higher effect of tax reform on trade openness than non-LDCs do. This is confirmed by a more general picture that shows how less advanced developing countries enjoy a higher positive effect of tax reform on trade openness than relatively advanced developing countries do.
I. Introduction
International trade tax revenue still represents an important share of a country's total public revenue. Thus, one reason underlying the adoption of restrictive trade policy measures by policymakers in developing countries is the fear of losing this revenue because of greater trade openness or the liberalization of trade regimes. In fact, several studies have reported evidence of the negative effect of trade liberalization on tax revenue (e.g., Cagé and Gadenne 2018 , Hisali 2012 , Khattry and Rao 2002 . The potential tax revenue losses associated with greater trade liberalization (or trade openness) has led international financial institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, to advise policymakers of developing countries to undertake a tax reform (or "tax transition reform") (e.g., Chambas 2005, Keen Tax Reform and Trade Openness in Developing Countries 499 2012). This reform is expected to transform the structure of the tax revenue in these countries from its current high dependence on international trade tax revenue to a greater dependence on domestic tax revenue. Such a tax reform would ultimately lead to a tax structure in developing countries that is similar to the one in developed countries (industrialized nations), where the trade tax revenue is far lower than the domestic tax revenue (Tanzi 1992 , Zee 1996 , Tanzi and Zee 2000 .
The policy advice of the international financial institutions rests on the idea of a tariff-tax reform involving a one-unit reduction in tariff and, concomitantly, a one-unit increase in the consumption tax. As noted by Keen and Ligthart (2002) , this proportional tariff-tax reform does not affect consumer prices, but does affect the production sector of the economy. Thus, a reduction of implicit production subsidies (due to declining tariffs) would allow efficient allocation of resources in the production sector, generate welfare gains, and also increase public revenue. The literature on the tariff-tax reform has usually investigated the effect of tariff-tax reform on market access, public revenue, and welfare (e.g., Fujiwara 2013 , Hatzipanayotou et al. 1994 , Keen and Ligthart 2002 , Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller 2008 , Karakosta and Tsakiris 2014 . Specifically, the literature on the effect of tariff-tax reform on market access (defined as the value of import volumes at the world price) has usually focused on one specific tariff-tax reform that involves a one-unit tariff reduction and an increase in consumption tax by one unit, as advised by international financial institutions. Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) showed that this policy reform is welfare-improving for a competitive, small economy. Whereas Keen and Ligthart (2002) generalized this result, they later demonstrated that, in the context of imperfect competition, this result no longer holds (Keen and Ligthart 2005) . Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Møller (2008) theoretically proposed that point-by-point policy reform might not increase market access, although it may improve welfare and increase revenue. Fujiwara (2013) theoretically proved that, under decreasing marginal costs, point-by-point policy reform improves market access, welfare, and public revenue.
The current analysis aims to examine the effect of tax reform on trade openness in developing countries. Compared with previous studies on the market access effect of tariff-tax reform, which we highlighted above, the novelty of the current study is twofold. First, it relies on an indicator that captures tax (transition) reform, as defined above, and which is constructed based on the semi-metric Bray-Curtis dissimilarity index (Bray and Curtis 1957) . This indicator captures the degree of convergence of a developing country's tax structure toward the tax structure of developed countries. Second, we focus on trade openness and not on market access, although both concepts are interrelated. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on the effect of tax reform on trade openness.
The empirical analysis is conducted using a panel dataset of 92 countries and spans the 1980~2014 period. It shows that tax reform induces greater trade openness. This positive effect is dependent on the income level of countries (a proxy for their development level), as, among developing countries, less developing ones experience a higher positive effect of tax reform on trade openness than relatively advanced developing countries do.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the indicator of tax reform used in the analysis, whereas section 3 discusses the measure of trade openness. Section 4 discusses how tax reform could influence trade openness. Section 5 presents the model specification that helps address the subject of this article and discusses the appropriate econometric estimator to conduct the empirical analysis. Section 6 presents empirical results, and section 7 concludes the paper.
II. Measure of the Extent of Tax Reform
Following Gnangnon and Brun (2019b) , the extent of tax reform is measured by relying on the semi-metric Bray-Curtis dissimilarity index (Bray and Curtis 1957) . This index allows us to compare the tax structure of a given developing country to the tax structure of developed countries. It captures the degree of convergence of a developing country's tax structure toward the tax structure of developed countries (qualified as "old industrialized countries"). It is worth noting that the Bray-Curtis index has been used before in natural sciences and social sciences such as international trade (e.g., Finger and Kreinin 1979 , De Benedictis and Tajoli 2007 .
The formula of the Bray-Curtis index applied to the tax structure is as follows:
where DIRTAX, INDIRTAX, and TRTAX are, for a given developing country, the ratio of direct tax revenue in its GDP, ratio of indirect tax revenue in its GDP, and ratio of trade tax revenue in its GDP, respectively. DIRTAXAve, INDIRTAXAve, and TRTAXAve are, for developed countries, the average (over all developed countries, in a given year) of the direct tax revenue to GDP ratio, indirect tax revenue to GDP ratio, and international trade tax revenue to GDP ratio, respectively. Natural resource revenue is excluded from all tax revenue variables to capture a more homogenous indicator of tax reform. In fact, many countries are dependent on natural resources for their tax revenue; including natural resource revenue in the abovementioned tax revenue variables would thus generate a misleading indicator of tax reform. It might even lead to erroneous empirical outcomes and policy conclusions.
The index of tax reform (denoted "TAXREF") is then calculated as follows:   (1). For a given country in a given year, this index reflects whether the country's tax structure is converging toward (or diverging from) the tax structure of developed countries. The values of this index range between 0 and 100. Higher values indicate a greater extent of tax reform, that is, a convergence of the tax structure of a given developing country toward that of developed countries. Inversely, declining values of this index indicate a lower extent of tax reform, that is, a divergence between the tax structure of a given developing country and of developed countries. We provide in Appendix 1 the list of developed countries that are used as a benchmark to compute the index of tax reform.
As observed by Gnangnon and Brun (2019b) , the above index has been computed using tax revenue variables, which themselves depend on countries' structural factors, such as the development level, population size, structure of output, degree of trade openness, and institutional quality (e.g., Baunsgaard and Keen 2010 , Crivelli 2016 , Gnangnon and Brun 2017 , Khattry and Rao 2002 . Thus, it could be considered a de facto measure of tax reform and not a de jure measure, which would better reflect policymakers' decisions concerning the implementation of tax reform. Nevertheless, by controlling for many of these structural factors in the model specification, we could uncover the genuine effect of tax reform, thus reflecting the policymakers' decision on the degree of trade openness.
III. Measure of Trade Openness
In the literature, trade openness has sometimes been used interchangeably with trade policy.
However, these two variables reflect different realities 1) . Trade openness is an outcome of several a measure of "residual openness," 2) "freedom to trade internationally" 3) indicator, and the de jure index of trade globalization, which is a weighted index of trade regulations, trade taxes, tariffs, and trade agreements (see Dreher 2006 , Gygli et al. 2019 ).
As noted above, de facto measures of trade openness are outcome indicators. They include, for example, price-based indicators such as the Dollar-type index 4) (Dollar 1992) as well as quantity-based indicators such as the trade share (i.e., the ratio of exports plus imports of goods and services in percentage of GDP), which is widely used in the empirical literature. Quantity-based indicators also include the de facto index of trade globalization, which is a weighted index of trade in goods as well as in services and partner diversity (see Dreher 2006 and Gygli et al. 2019) . More recently, Squalli and Wilson (2011) highlighted the limits of the traditional measure of trade openness (i.e., the trade share) and proposed another de facto trade openness indicator, calculated as the trade share indicator adjusted by the proportion of a country's trade level relative to the average world trade (see Squalli and Wilson 2011, p. 1758) . This indicator has an advantage of providing good indication of a country's level of integration into the global trade market. We primarily use the indicator proposed by Squalli and Wilson (2011) . For the robustness check, we use the standard trade openness measure (i.e., the ratio of exports plus imports of goods and services in percentage of GDP).
IV. Discussion on the Effect of Tax Reform on Trade Openness
From a theoretical perspective, we argue that any tax reform would mainly affect trade openness through its effect on public revenue, notably tax revenue. In that respect, we could expect that, by inducing higher tax revenue, tax reform would generate higher trade openness (hypothesis 1). However, if tax reform is associated with lower tax revenue (because countries are not able to raise domestic tax revenue to at least compensate for the trade tax revenue losses arising from greater trade openness), then it would be associated with lower level of
2) The residual openness index is calculated using a regression of the trade share on the non-policy determinants of trade flows (demographic and geographic factors) to separate "natural openness" (i.e., fitted value of the regression) from "residual openness" (the residual of the regression, which reflects the "man-made choices" shaping a country's trade openness) (e.g., Saadi-Sedik 2006, Esfahani and Squire 2007) . 3) This is a is a key component of the Economic freedom Index. There are two types of this indicator: one is proposed by the Heritage Foundation with data starting from 1995 onward (for further information, see online at: https://www.heritage.org/index/explore) and another, which is closely related to the previous one, is developed by the Fraser Institute, and covers the period from 1970 onward. Data for this indicator from 1970 to 1999 are provided every five years and data from 2000 are provided annually (for further information, see online at: https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom/dataset?geozone=world&year=2016&page=dataset&min-year=2 &max-year=0&filter=0). 4) The Dollar-type index is calculated as the ratio of the actual real exchange rate relative to its predicted value based on the regression of the real exchange rate on its nonpolicy determinants.
trade openness (hypothesis 2). We discuss, in turn, each of these hypotheses.
Concerning hypothesis 1, we argue that, if tax reform allows developing countries to recoup more than the trade tax revenue losses (by substantially increase domestic revenue) and increase their total tax revenue, then policymakers might not fear opening up their economies to international trade. The rise in public revenue would help them promote international trade through investment in all factors that contribute to enhancing international trade flows, notably infrastructure, human capital, and institutional quality (conducive business environment). In this context, tax reform would be associated with greater trade openness.
Recent studies (Baunsgaard and Keen 2010 , Crivelli 2016 , Moller 2016 , and Waglé 2011 have explored whether developing countries have recouped the trade tax revenue losses induced by trade liberalization from other sources, including domestic tax revenue. They report that countries endeavor to recoup the lost trade tax revenue by increasing the domestic tax revenue.
For example, Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) provided empirical evidence to show that the replacement rate is low for low-income countries even though the signs of recovery vary across countries. However, middle-and high-income countries have been able to recoup the lost trade tax revenue from other sources. Waglé (2011) found that the tax recovery in low-income countries is much more robust than that shown by Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) , although long term replacement is statistically significant only for a few countries. In the same vein, Moller (2016) revealed that low-income countries that have simultaneously initiated a process of democratization are those that have enjoyed a significant tax recovery. Crivelli (2016) provided empirical evidence to show that, for transition economies in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, North Africa, and the Middle East, there is strong revenue replacement of lost trade tax revenue with total domestic tax revenue, notably through the value-added tax and personal income tax.
In addition to its indirect effect on trade openness through tax revenue, tax reform could also influence trade openness through its effect on trade policy. In fact, policymakers should further open up their trade regimes to ensure countries can collect higher domestic tax revenue during the tax reform process. This is because higher value addition to domestic production is an important determinant of tax revenue (e.g., Baunsgaard and Keen 2010 , Crivelli 2016 , Gnangnon and Brun 2017 , Khattry and Rao 2002 . Further, trade policy liberalization is essential to encourage domestic firms to add value to their production by reducing their production costs, As for the second hypothesis, countries (for example, very poor countries) could lack the capacity-including human resources in the tax and revenue administrations-to effectively design the tax reform (tax policy as well as tax and revenue administration reforms) that would help undertake tax reform successfully, such as by raising the level of total tax revenue in the context of declining trade tax revenue. In this scenario, the tax reform would be negatively associated with trade openness. However, development aid could help countries that are facing difficulties in successfully undertaking the tax reform through, for example, technical assistance to help them design tax policy as well as tax and revenue administrations reforms, or by affecting the distribution of the costs and benefits of the reform. That is to say-in the latter case, by targeting groups (including firms and households) that would be adversely affected by the implementation of the reform. (e.g., Attila et al. 2009 , Gnangnon 2019a . In this specific case, tax reform would be associated with greater trade openness.
V. Empirical Analysis
This section presents the model specification that would help empirically test the effect of tax reform on trade openness. It then discusses the econometric estimator to estimate this model.
A. Model specification
To empirically examine the effect of tax reform on trade openness, we draw on certain extant studies (e.g., Fukumoto and Kinugasa 2017 , Goswami 2013 , Guttmann and Richards 2006 on the determinants of trade openness 5) (i.e., de facto trade openness). In addition to the main variable of interest, which is the de facto measure of trade openness, we use control variables that could affect the effect of tax reform on trade openness. These control variables include a de jure trade openness indicator (trade policy) ("TRJURE"); development aid flows ("NAT"); real per capita income ("GDPC"), which captures countries' development level; depth of financial development ("FINDEV"); institutional quality proxied by the democratization level of countries ("POLITY2"); current account balance ("CAGDP"); inflation rate (whose transformation is denoted "INFL"; see Appendix 1); and countries' size, measured by the population size ("POP").
We expect restrictive trade policies to result in lower import flows. Restrictive trade measures would also adversely affect export flows if they increase the costs of intermediate inputs used
by exporting firms in their production processes of exportable goods and services. Likewise, 5) It is worth highlighting that, in their respective studies, Milner and Kutoba (2005) as well as Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) have used both de jure and de facto measures of trade openness in their analysis.
we expect a rise in the development level to result in lower barriers to trade (e.g., Easterly
and Rebelo 1993, Rodrik 1995 , Svaleryd and Vlachos 2002 , Milner and Kutoba 2005 , and hence induce greater trade openness. At the same time, an increase in the population size could lead governments to adopt restrict trade policies (e.g., Rodrik 1997) With respect to the effect of financial development on trade openness, a number of authors have shown that countries that are financially developed and have well-functioning financial institutions (i.e., where restrictions in the credit market are low) would specialize in financially intensive goods and services, which would promote trade, particularly exports (Kletzer and Bardhan 1987 , Rajan and Zingales 1998 , Chaney 2005 , Manova 2005 ). Along the same lines, Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) argued that a developed financial system helps diversify the private sector's risks, and thus promotes trade openness. They provided empirical support for the positive effect of financial development on trade openness. In the same vein, Kim et al. (2010) empirically demonstrated that financial development exerts a positive effect on trade openness in countries that are not members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Incidentally, an improvement in the institutional quality is expected to enhance trade openness (e.g., Jansen and Nordås 2004, Wu et al. 2012) , whereas a lower inflation rate (which reflects higher macroeconomic stability) is expected to lead to higher trade openness.
In countries that experience a deterioration of their current account, governments might be willing to promote trade, including by reducing trade barriers and implementing export promotion policies. This would drive import flows, especially if trading firms extensively use imported intermediate inputs for producing final goods. We therefore expect deterioration in the current account to be positively associated with trade openness.
Against this background, we postulate the following model (1):
where the subscript i represents a given country's index, and t represents the time-period. Based on available data, we construct an unbalanced panel dataset comprising 92 developing countries (which excludes countries classified by the World Bank as "High-Income Countries") spanning the period 1980~2014. We use non-overlapping five-year sub-periods of average data to smooth out the effect of business cycles on the variables. These sub-periods are 1980~1984, 1985~1989, 1990~1994, 1995~1999, 2000~2004, 2005~2009, and 2010~2014 . α  to α  are the coefficients to be estimated. μ  represents countries' fixed effects; ω  is an idiosyncratic error-term. γ  represent global shocks that simultaneously affect all countries' trade openness.
The descriptions and source of variables used in model (2) are provided in Appendix 1.
The descriptive statistics on these variables are displayed in Appendix 2. The list of countries contained in the full sample are reported in Appendix 3.
Note that do not apply the natural logarithm to the variables CAGDP and POLITY2, because they contain zero values and/or negative values. The variable capturing inflation is transformed using the method proscribed by Yeyati et al. (2007) (see Appendix 1).
The dependent variable "TROPEN" represents the measure of the de facto trade openness.
As noted above, it is primarily measured by the trade openness indicator proposed by Squalli and Wilson (2011) , which is denoted as "OPENSW." For the robustness check, the standard measure of trade openness ("OPEN") is employed. The one-period lag of TROPEN is introduced in model (1) to capture the state-dependence nature of the trade openness variable to be persistent over time.
To obtain initial insight into the correlation pattern between tax reform and trade openness in developing countries, Figure 1 illustrates the cross-plot between each of the two measures of trade openness and our indicator of tax reform. It appears from the two graphs in this figure that tax reform is positively correlated with trade openness.
B. Econometric methodology
The dynamic nature of model (2) To address these endogeneity concerns in the estimation of model (2), we employ the two-step system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) estimator (see Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998) . This estimator entails the estimation of a system of equations that includes an equation in differences and an equation in levels. The lagged first differences are used as instruments for the level equation, whereas the lagged levels are used as instruments for the first-difference equation. This estimator is suitable for dynamic panels (including unbalanced panels), where the series exhibit a strong persistence over time.
Overall, our main econometric estimator is the two-step system GMM estimator. However, for the sake of comparison, we also report the outcomes of the estimation of a static version of model (2) (that is, model (2) from which we exclude the one-period lag of the dependent variable, and where the dependent variable is OPENSW). For this purpose, we use two standard estimators: the fixed effects estimator (denoted "FE-DK"), where standard errors have been corrected using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) technique. This technique addresses heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and contemporaneous cross-sectional dependence in the error term. The second estimator is the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). The results of the estimations of the static version of model (2) using these estimators are displayed in Table 1 .
The results in Table 2 are based on the estimation of model (2) as well as some variants of this model, by means of the two-step system GMM estimator. We report the outcome of the estimation of dynamic model (2) (2), where OPEN is used (for a robustness check) as the measure of trade openness. In column [3], we display the outcome of the estimation of a specification of model (2) that allows us to examine whether there is a differentiated effect of tax reform on trade openness in poor countries versus nonpoor countries.
We follow the United Nations definition and consider "Least Developed Countries" (LDCs)
as the poorest countries. In fact, based on several criteria, 9) the United Nations has identified a set of countries (LDCs) qualified as the poorest and most vulnerable (in the world) to environmental and external shocks. The list of LDCs used in the analysis is provided in Appendix 3. To perform the analysis, we create a dummy variable "LDC," which takes the value 1 for LDCs and is 0 otherwise. This dummy variable is then made to interact with the TAXREF variable. Both variables are included in the model specification, which is estimated using the two-step system GMM approach. In column [4] of Table 2, 
VI. Empirical Results
The results reported in the two columns of Table 1 suggest a positive and significant effect of tax reform on trade openness, although the magnitude of the effect in the two columns are slightly different (the coefficient is 0.4 for the results based on the FE-DK estimator and 0.6 for the result based on the FGLS estimator).
We note from the control variables that the results are not necessarily similar in the two columns of current account balance, a rise in the population size, and financial development are positively associated with trade openness, while development aid flows, inflation, and the institutional quality are negatively associated with trade openness. As indicated in the previous section, these results are likely biased. Therefore, we turn to Table 2 , which contains the results based on the two-step system GMM estimator. First, we note that across the three columns of this 
One Table 2 reports the results of the three tests that allows us to check the appropriateness of the two-step system GMM estimator in estimating model (1) and its variants highlighted above. These tests include the Arellano-Bond TAXREF is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, and the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The combination of these two results suggests that there is a turning point of the 
VII. Conclusion
This article examined the effect of tax reform on trade openness using an unbalanced panel dataset containing 92 developing countries, covering 1980 to 2014. The empirical analysis was conducted using an indicator of tax reform that captures the extent to which a developing country's tax structure converges toward developed countries' tax structure.
Over the full sample, the results suggest that tax reform is positively associated with trade openness. In addition, less advanced developing countries (such as poor countries) experience a higher positive effect of tax reform on trade openness than relatively advanced developing countries do. Overall, these findings suggest the tax (transition) reform in developing countries, including in poor countries, would increase their level of trade openness. The benefits of trade openness, including when accompanied by complementarity policies, have been well established in the literature (e.g., Chang et al. 2009 ). Therefore, measures that contribute to greater trade openness, while also mitigating its adverse effects on the economy, should be promoted.
Governments in developing countries should pursue tax transition reforms, especially with the assistance of relevant international institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the United
Nations. An avenue for future research could be to propose another indicator of tax "transition" reform, which would accurately reflect the governments' will to implement tax transition reform (de jure tax reform) and the extent of such tax reform. We note that this would be a challenging task.
